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The study examines the relationship between management and governance 
mechanisms upon the performance of family-owned companies. The results 
indicated	that	the	performances	of	family-owned	companies’	were	influenced	
by the implementation of corporate governance in their management 
processes.	Hence,	the	result	reveals	a	significant	association	between	family-
owned companies’ performance in relation to management and governance 
mechanisms.	However,	 the	findings	 found	 that	Malaysian	 family-owned	
companies may be reluctant to protect the minority shareholders’ rights 
as	the	findings	show	that	the	independent	directors	portrayed	significant	
negative	 association	with	 the	 firm’s	 performance.	 The	 presence	 of	 the	
independent directors in the company could not improve the monitoring of 
the	management	activities	and	on	shareholders’	influence.	In	addition,	the	
ROE result shows that the larger managerial ownerships, the higher the 
firms’	performance	but	in	turn	it	will	heighten	the	minority	shareholders’	
expropriation. The higher level of managerial ownership could lead to 
management	 entrenchment	and	 ineffective	monitoring	due	 to	 conflict	of	
interest.  
Keywords: Corporate	Governance,	family	firms,	firm	performance
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INTRODUCTION
Various researchers define family firms differently. Due to this inconsistency, 
it appears that there is no consensus regarding the exact definition of a 
family firm. Miller et. al. (2007) reiterates that many definition of family 
firms with various classification of firms. They found that a family firm 
has been characterized as an organization which is usually controlled and 
managed by multiple family members (Shanker & Astrachan, 1996) and 
over a time frame of several generations (Andersons & Reeb, 2003). Some 
family-owned companies are characterized according to the proportion of 
equity ownership. According to Saito (2008), the founder or his descendent 
and the founding family will hold the largest shareholding in the company 
and this could be recognized as a family firm in Japan. Family firm can also 
be defined by the percentage of voting rights held by family members i.e. 
where family members hold at least 10% of voting rights (Maury, 2006). 
If more than 20% of voting rights held by family members (La Porta et. 
al., 1999), it will be considered as the largest controlling shareholder in 
the companies.
Naturally, family-owned companies usually start from a small business 
and gradually develop the company’s assets to become a large business that 
allows them to be listed on the stock exchange. According to Claessens et. 
al. (2000), about 70% of Malaysian companies are family-owned. Two-
thirds of the existing companies in Malaysia are made up of family-owned 
companies (Jasani, 2002). Shanker and Astrachan (1996) defined family 
firms as an organization controlled and usually managed by multiple family 
members and multiple generations (Andersons & Reeb, 2003). Family-
owned companies comprise of controlling owner, sibling partnerships and 
cousin consortium (Gersick et. al., 1997). The controlling owner, known 
as the founder of the company, controls most of the firm’s ownership and 
management. Sibling partnerships are formed when the founder distributes 
his shareholdings to his children. The cousin consortium will be formed after 
the ownership is distributed to the next generation of sibling partnerships 
(Lubatkin et. al., 2005). However, this research focuses on the general 
family-owned companies with the definition based on previous studies 
without classifying the stages of family firms.
This study differs from previous studies as all the information on 
family relationships are extracted from the corporate information section 
to determine the board of directors’ name that may establish family ties for 
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example, the Chinese name by looking at the surname; while the Malay and 
Indian name by looking at the last name, e.g. Ahmad bin Ali, Aminah binti 
Ali or Pavaly a/l Muthusamy, Moona a/p Muthusamy. However, a detail 
analysis of the sample is made by looking at the directors profile section 
where the content provides the information about the directors’ relationships. 
If there are two or more family members who are officers or directors, 
the company is considered to be family-owned which is consistent with 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) and Gomez-Mejia et. al. (2003). In addition, 
this study applied the fraction of equity stake held by all family members 
as being at least 5% and more (Claessens et. al., 2000; Gomez-Mejia et. al., 
2003). This fraction of equity ownership is calculated by referring to the 
direct and indirect shareholdings (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) of the family 
members extracted from the shareholding analysis section in the company 
annual reports (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; La Porta et. al, 1998). 
Objectives of the Study
The main objective of this study is to examine whether governance 
mechanisms in family-owned companies have any relationship with 
the firm’s performance. The sub-objectives and research questions are 
developed according to the relationship between the firm’s performance 
and management and governance mechanisms such as board size, board 
composition, role duality and managerial ownership. The sub-objectives 
are to examine whether board size, role duality, board composition and 
managerial ownership influences the firm’s performance. The research 
questions are: Does any significant association exist between board size, role 
duality, board composition and managerial ownership to firm performance?
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN
Sample Selection
The sample of public-listed family-owned company’s consists of 
1124 observation was obtained from the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia’s 
website. The sample covers six industries on the main market, namely 
consumer product, industrial product, construction, plantation, properties 
and technology. The period from 2006 until 2009 was chosen because it 
was the latest 4 year source of information available at the time of the study. 
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The year 2010 was not chosen as the sample year since the submission of 
the annual report for all public listed companies on Bursa Malaysia were 
incomplete. Table 1 summarizes the process of selecting the final sample 
of the companies in the study. 
Table 1:  Sample Selection
 
No. Industry No. of Family Firm No. of Observation 
 (4 years)
1 Construction 23 92
2 Consumer Products 61   244
3 Industrial Products 129 516
4 Plantation 17 68
5 Properties 44 176
6 Technology 7 28
Total 281 1124
Less : Companies with incomplete data (29 x 4 years)
           Less companies with outliers
           
116
25
Final sample of observation available for analysis 983
DATA COLLECTION 
Data related to the management and governance and the financial indicator 
was extracted from the companies’ annual reports. The data collection 
consisted of three types of variables which were dependent, independent 
and control variables. The dependent variables were family-owned 
companies’ performance and the independent variables were board size, 
board composition, role duality and managerial ownership, while control 
variable is firm size. 
The second step was to analyse the shareholding of each family 
member on the board who holds direct shares in the company. The companies 
which have at least 5% or more of the shares held by all family members 
meet the family-owned criteria. The third step is calculating the ROA 
and ROE on each sample as indicators of the firm’s performance. The 
information extracted from the income statements and balance sheets were 
manually calculated using the formula found in Microsoft Office Excel 
2007. The analysis of the data was for the financial year ending 2006 until 
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2009.  The data relating to independent and control variables such as board 
size, board composition, duality role, managerial ownership and firm size 
was extracted from the relevant sections, in particular from the corporate 
governance section, analysis of shareholdings section and also the income 
statement and balance sheet were from the companies’ annual report. 
DATA ANALYSIS
Firm Performance
After identifying family-owned companies, each company was then 
carefully examined to determine the firm performance. Most of the previous 
studies used the financial based performance measurement especially return 
on asset (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and Tobin-Q to investigate the firm 
performance (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006, Anderson & Reeb, 2003, Martinez et. 
al., 2007 and Villalonga & Amit, 2006). According to Martinez et. al. (2007), 
financial performance should be divided into two types which are accounting 
performance for ROA and ROE ratios, while the market performance for 
a proxy of Tobins-Q. This study focuses on the accounting performance 
to determine if there is any significant relationship exists between family-
owned companies and performance. The ROA and ROE measured from the 
firm values from the annual report. This study uses ROA because the value 
of ROA indicates the effectiveness of the company’s asset usage in satisfying 
the shareholders’ interest.  The formula of ROA is earnings after tax divided 
by total assets of the company (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006 and Martinez et. 
al., 2007).   The value of ROE indicates the shareholders’ expectation on 
their investment return. The formula is the ratio of net income for the year 
divided by the shareholder’s equity of the company (Ibrahim et. al., 2008). 
Independent and Control Variables
The independent variables consist of the management and governance 
mechanisms such as board independence, board size, role duality, managerial 
ownership and size of the company. Table 2 summarises all the variables 
used in the hypotheses tests.
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Table 2:  Operationalisation of the Variables
Variables Acronym Operationalisation
Dependent variables:
Return on Asset ROA Ratio of the net income for the year divided by total equity 
of the company.
Return on Equity ROE Ratio of earnings after tax divided by total assets of the 
company.
Independent variables:
Board Size BSIZE Total number of directors on the board of the company.
Categories of Board Size BODSIZE Indicator variable with the value of “1” if  the directors is 
less than 9 members on the board and “0” if otherwise.
Board Composition BODCOM The ratio of independent NED to total number of directors 
on the board of company.
Categories of Board 
Composition
BCOM Indicator variable with the value of “1” if the presentage of 
independent directors is lower than 38% on the board and 
“0” if otherwise.
Role Duality DUAL Indicator variable with the value of “1”if the chairman is also 
the CEO of the company and “0” is otherwise. 
Managerial Ownership MOWN The ratio of shares owned by executive directors of the 
company as a group to total shares outstanding.
Categories of Managerial 
Ownership
MOWNSHIP Indicator variable with the value of “1” if managerial 
ownership is less than 25% of  shares held by executive 
directors and “0” if otherwise.
Control VariableFirm Size SIZE Natural log of sales of the company. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
Generally, family businesses were started by the founder and subsequently 
continued by their children. Therefore, family members and family 
ownership can have a substantial influence on the management of the 
companies. Crisis between the majority and minority shareholders may 
also occur in family-owned companies and consequently increase the 
agency cost. Most of the family members hold substantial shares in the 
company and the remaining shares are held by others. As such, the majority 
shareholders (family members) have the opportunity to expropriate the 
minority shareholders’ right (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Morck & Yeung, 
2003). 
Andersons and Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) defined 
family firm as where a member of the founding family either through blood 
or family, hold at least 5% of the firms’ equity. Villalonga et. al. (2006) 
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explained family firm definition to include content of family generation 
stages. The family-owned companies have been classified into several 
stages which are founder generation, 2nd generation and later generation 
of family firm. The founder family-owned companies can be identified by 
looking directly at proxy statements in the Annual Reports e.g. statement by 
the founder and his/her family equity holding (Andersons & Reeb, 2003). 
Lansberg (1999) noted that the formations of family-owned companies 
are related to the generation stages, known as three-level typology of 
family ownership stages. These stages consist of controlling owner, sibling 
partnerships and cousin consortium (Gersick et. al., 1997). The controlling 
owner run the companies in the first generation, followed by sibling 
partnerships in the second and a cousin consortium in the third. 
Family-owned companies are fundamentally different from other 
companies. One of the traits presents in family-owned companies is that 
the companies’ environment fully encourages the love of businesses 
and this strengthens their commitment to the businesses (Chami, 1997). 
Specifically, participation of family members in business activities as part 
of the management team, as board members as well as the shareholders 
gives them opportunities to consult and monitor the board of directors. In 
addition, the improvement in the monitoring system might also increase 
the firms’ performance (Poza, 2007). Furthermore, the long-term nature of 
family relationship is advantageous in monitoring and disciplining managers 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983).
Previous researchers have examined the characteristics of family 
ownership on the firm’s performance of family-owned companies.  Studies 
from developed countries such as United States and Western Europe 
showed that family-owned companies perform better than non-family firms 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Maury, 2006; Martinez et. al., 2007). The results 
in developing countries such as Southeast Asian countries indicated that 
family firms underperform as compared to non-family firms (Claessens and 
Fan, 2002).  However, these studies did not deeply reveal the increase or 
decrease of family firms’ performance in relation to corporate governance.
There are some family-owned companies which have poor 
performance than non-family firm. According to agency theorists, family 
control in family-owned companies could increase the agency cost in the 
companies. A company which is controlled by family members will have an 
opportunity to expropriate other shareholders by raising their concentrated 
block holding of shares. This can be carried out either by means of excessive 
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compensation, related-party transactions, special dividends, and risk 
avoidance (Anderson & Reeb 2003; Morck & Yeung 2003; Anderson et al. 
2002).  Therefore, the decrease of family-owned companies’ performance 
stems from the corporate governance issues. This paper attempts to examine 
the relationship of corporate governance mechanisms and family-owned 
companies listed on Bursa Malaysia for the year 2006 until 2009. 
Another problem that can arise in family-owned companies is that of 
information asymmetries. Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found that Malaysian 
companies disclose less when family members sit on the board. Easy 
accessibility of the company’s internal information to family members 
who sit on the board may result in information withholding. Therefore, 
the demand for disclosure of information to the public in the annual report 
of the companies is higher as compared to when non-family members sit 
on the board. These problems could influence the performance of family-
owned companies.  
Hence, some researchers have conducted several studies on the 
association between corporate governance mechanisms and family firm 
performance (Klein, 1998; Daily & Dalton,1998; Chau & Leung, 2006; 
Ferris & Yan, 2007; Leford & Urzua 2008; Chen & Nowland, 2008). 
There were also studies conducted in Malaysia to examine the relationship 
between family-owned companies performance and corporate governance 
mechanisms (Tee and Chan, 2008; Ibrahim et. al., 2008; Amran and Ahmad, 
2009). This study attempts to examine whether the corporate governance 
mechanisms practiced by family-owned companies have any relationship 
with firm performance. 
Family-owned companies in the perspective of management:  
Agency and Stewardship 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), agency management takes 
place when there is a contract between the principal (shareholder) and the 
agent (CEO and top managements) to perform some services on their behalf. 
This theory has two types of agency problem related to the family firm 
(Villalonga et. al., 2006; Ali et. al., 2007) which are separation of ownership 
and management (Type I agency problem) and conflict between controlling 
and non-controlling (minority) shareholders (Type II agency problem). 
Previous researchers found that family firms mainly have problems in the 
type II agency problem rather than type I agency problem. Andersons and 
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Reeb (2003) and Ali et.al. (2007) state, when the family managers have more 
control over the firm, it provides opportunity for entrenchment. As a result, 
the minority shareholder could be expropriated by majority shareholder 
(Fan & Wong, 2002). 
Other studies have shown that when family members have the principal 
control in the firm, it does not affect the presence of the independent directors 
as a monitoring mechanism in reducing the agency cost (Jaggi et. al., 2009). 
However, managerial ownership held by family members in the board 
of directors could reduce the agency problem. According to Andersons 
and Reeb (2003) and Maury (2006) evidence show that when the family 
ownership increases to the optimal point, it reduces the agency problem 
and enhances performance. However, entrenchment would take place 
when the managerial ownership increases further. As a result, performance 
would be at stake. Anderson and Reeb (2003) found that the percentage of 
managerial ownership could increase performance around 30%. If however 
the percentage is increased further, it would create agency problem.
From another standpoint, the agency cost differs across generations. 
Blanco-Mazagatos et. al. (2007) analysed the influence of financial resources 
on the agency cost in family-owned companies and discovered that agency 
cost in the first generation was lower. This is because the founder who is 
active in management with limited financial resources could control the 
agency problems. The second and later generations tend to incur higher 
agency cost because of the dispersion of ownership and the diversity of 
roles that family member perform in the firm. Additionally, information 
asymmetries and conflict of interest between shareholder and manager would 
increase. In this case, the weakness is the lack of governance mechanism 
to reduce managerial opportunism. 
On the other hand, the stewardship management principles are 
practised when the interplay between trust and family occurs in family-
owned companies. The presence and involvement of one or more controlling 
family in the management are the main characteristics that distinguish the 
family firms from the other types of corporations. Because of these factors, 
the family constitution1 and traits influence the management environment. 
The harmonization of emotion and behaviour of family members are 
essential to avoid disrupting the management of the business by the build-up 
of trust element among them. Besides, the deep interpersonal trust developed 
1 The family vision, mission, values, and policies regulating family members’ relationship 
with the business. 
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among them that applies within internal and external network creates 
competitive advantages for the success of the family-owned companies 
(Karra, Tracey & Phillips, 2006). 
Most of the family-owned companies perceived a significantly higher 
value of stewardship perceptions in family firm leadership rather than non-
family firm (Davis, Allen & Hayes, 2010). The quality of relationship of 
leader-follower, trust and commitment are essential in stewardship behaviour 
in family-owned companies (Pearson & Marler, 2010). The benefit behind 
the stewardship motive and behaviour is to be a good steward as a family 
leader towards his or her family. Consequently, ‘the good steward is more 
likely to be concerned with the employees’ welfare, with regard to continuity 
of employment; assignments to challenging, desirable jobs; opportunities to 
have new experiences; and other behaviours which many employees would 
view as supportive and positive’ (Pearson & Marler, 2010, p.1120). As a 
result, the family-owned companies create a higher quality of relationship 
between a leader and his employees which is both family and non-family 
employees. The trust, respect, obligation and commitments are developed 
among employees of family firms that create an effective leadership. 
Davis et. al. (2010), found that the stewardship behaviour is positively 
associated with trust and commitment among family employees. When the 
firm adopted the stewardship, trust among non-family employees will be 
developed. It proved that stewardship behaviour can assist the family firms in 
creating a healthy environment among their employees.  The reason behind 
the good steward practice in leadership is the influence of the director who 
practises the role duality in the family-owned companies. The stewardship 
perspective believes that the directors who hold two positions on the board 
which is the executive director and the chairman position would enhance the 
boards’ effectiveness in making the best decision for the shareholders and 
the firms (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). Furthermore, the corporate leadership is 
clearer and more consistent when the power and authority are concentrated 
toward one director (Donaldson & Davis, 1991).  
Descriptive Analysis
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistic for the number of industry 
based company. The study revealed that 44.3% of the companies in the 
Industrial Product category are family-owned companies with a mean 
of 0.0398 (ROA) and 0.1313 (ROE). The mean value of ROA and ROE 
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indicate that the companies in this industry perform better and effectively 
use the company’s asset to satisfy shareholders’ interest and is aligned 
with the shareholders’ expectation of good investment. On average, the 
companies under all industries except properties performed better. Table 
4.2 provides descriptive statistics for the overall family-owned companies 
and corporate governance mechanisms consisting of ROA, ROE, board 
size (BSIZE), role duality (DUAL), the presence of independent directors 
on the board (BODCOM), shares owned by executive directors (MOWN) 
and firm size (SIZE). 
Table 3:  Descriptive Statistic for Number of Companies based on Industry





Construction 88 8.9 0.0370 0.1163
Consumer Product 213 21.7 0.0364 0.1189
Industrial Product 435 44.3 0.0398 0.1313
Plantation 61 6.2 0.0382 0.1257
Properties 161 16.4 0.0332 0.1049
Technology 25 2.5 0.0361 0.1189
Total 983 100%
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
In terms of the validation of the model, there are several steps and 
assumptions that have to be made, which are, the error term is normally 
distributed, there are constant variance, the error terms are independent 
of each other and a linear relationship exists between each X and Y in the 
population. The study used linear multiple regression analysis to test the 
relationship between family-owned companies’ performance and corporate 
governance mechanisms (board size, independent NEDs on the board, 
role duality and managerial ownership) and control variable (firms’ size). 
The proxy for dummy variables are BODSIZE with the value of “1” if the 
directors are less than 9 members on the board and “0” otherwise, BCOM 
is indicator variable with the value of “1” the percentage of independent 
directors is less than 38% on the board and “0” otherwise. This figure is 
used to reflect good governance practices of at least one third of directors 
should be independent directors. 
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The following multivariate model is estimated as follows:
Model 1: 	Q-ROAt	=		αₒ	+	β1	BSIZE	+	β2	BODCOM	+	β3	DUAL	+		β4	
MOWN	+	β5	SIZE	+		dummy	variables	+	ε
Model 2 :  Q-ROEt	=	αₒ	+	β1	BSIZE	+	β2	BODCOM	+	β3	DUAL	+	β4	
MOWN	+	β5	SIZE	+			dummy	variables	+	ε
Q-ROAt = Return On Asset
 Q-ROEt = Return On Equity 
BSIZE = No. of board directors
BODCOM = Board composition; the proportion of independent directors on  
the board 
DUAL = Role Duality; chairman of the board of director is also as a 
CEO 
MOWN = Managerial ownership; shareholdings held by directors
SIZE = Size based on natural logarithm of sales
Dummy variables = The categorical of board size and board composition.
ε = Error term
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Board Size
The number of directors influences the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the company’s performance. It affects the administration and management 
structures (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), arrangement 
schedule, coordination of work, time taken in decision making at a 
meeting (Lansberg, 1999), level of monitoring activities (Ferris & Yan, 
2007) and also the level of understanding with diverse stakeholders and 
the management (Pearce & Zahra, 1992). From the perspective of agency 
theory, large size company requires greater number of directors to monitor 
and control the firm’s management.  
Previous researches have examined the association of board size and 
corporate performance. Most of the results indicate that a small board size 
have an effective monitoring, communicating and control of the company 
(Yermack, 1996; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Jensen & Meckling, 1976, Singh 
& Davidson, 2003; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). The studies on family firms 
also showed a significant negative relationship between board size and firm 
performance (Lansberg, 1999, Ibrahim et. al., 2008; Amran & Ahmad, 2009).
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Ferris and Yan (2007) alternatively posed that a large board size has 
a greater number of people reviewing the management actions. A large 
board makes effective monitoring activities in their management. Ehikioya 
(2009) suggests that a large board size has the ability to push the managers 
to pursue lower costs of debt and increase firms performance. This leads 
to the first null hypothesis:
H1: There is no association between the board size and family firm 
performance.
Role Duality 
Role duality measures the separation of leadership on the board of 
directors. MCCG recommended a balance of power and authority so that 
no one individual has unfettered power of decision. If the company has a 
combined role of chairperson and CEO, a strong independent candidate is 
important to sit on the board. Consistent with Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), 
the role duality is measured as value of “1” if the chairman is also the CEO 
of the company and “0” if otherwise.  
The chairman holds role duality when he is also the CEO of the 
company. Lau and Leung (2006) found that the separation of leadership on 
the board enhance the monitoring quality.  Consistent with prior researches, 
the current study focuses on role duality. Prior studies suggest that separate 
leadership is effective in monitoring the management (Donaldson & Davis, 
1991, Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Amran & Ahmad, 2009).         
On a contrary, Bartholomeusz and Tanewski (2006) indicated that 
family-owned companies are more likely to allow the role of CEO and 
chairman to be held by the same person than non-family owned companies. 
The family CEO as a steward has the ability to facilitate rapid decision 
making (Breton-Miller & Miller, 2009). According to the stewardship 
theory, the director who occupies the two top positions can easily achieve the 
company’s objectives. The foregoing discussion thus leads to the following 
null hypothesis:
H2: There is no association between role duality and family firm 
performance.
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Board Composition  
Board composition measures the percentage of independent directors 
on the board. The independent board members are classified according 
to the definition of Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements. To distinguish 
between non-executive directors and independent director, the Listing 
Requirement stated that independent directors are directors who are not 
officer of the companies, neither related to the officers nor representing the 
family holding of its shares. These independent directors, in the view of the 
company’s board represent the interest of the shareholders and are free of 
any relationship that would interfere with the exercise of their independent 
judgement. 
In this study, the board composition is measured as the ratio of 
independent NEDs to the total number of directors on board of each company 
(Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Shamser & Annuar, 1993). Previous study found 
that the firm performance is highest in Asian family-owned companies when 
board independence is 38 % and if it is more than 38% it will reduce the 
firm performance (Chen & Nowland, 2008). Therefore, the categories of 
board composition is measured as value of “1” if managerial ownership is 
lower than 25% of shares held by executive directors and “0” otherwise.  
According to MCCG 2000, the Code recommended that one third of 
the independent NED to sit on the board of directors. Therefore, this study 
follows the recommendation to determine the independent NED. Previous 
studies on business firm indicate that the association of independent NED 
and firms’ performance is a positive relationship. These evidences have 
been supported by Hillman and Dalziel (2003) on family firms where 
a significantly higher proportion of independent directors lead to the 
independence of board of directors. In addition, the higher proportion of 
independent directors can effectively monitor the activities and the decision 
of the management (Chau & Leung, 2006).
However, from the family firms’ perspectives, the presence of 
the majority of independent directors in family firms tend to have poor 
performance due to less knowledge of the firms (Klein et. al., 2005). 
Bartholomeusz and Tanewski (2006) also found that family firms are likely 
to have a lower proportion of independent directors on their boards than 
non-family firms. Mishra (2001), Klein et. al. (2005) and Amran and Ahmad 
(2009) indicate that independent board is negatively related to performance. 
The hypothesis to be tested, stated in its null form is:
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H3: There is no association between board composition and family firm 
performance.
Managerial Ownership
Managerial ownership measures the proportion of shares owned by 
company’s executive directors. Prior research indicates that the managerial 
ownership is positively associated with firm performance (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). The share incentives could motivate the managers to 
enhance performance. The managerial ownership is measured by the 
proportion of shares owned by executive directors of the company as a group 
to total shares outstanding (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). This study focuses 
on the direct shares in the company owned by the executive directors on 
the board. However, previous studies found a significant positive (<25%) 
and negative (>25%) relationship of managerial ownership with firm 
performance (Jelinek & Stuerke, 2009; Chau & Leung, 2006; Anderson & 
Reeb, 2003). Therefore, the categories of managerial ownership is measured 
as value of “1” if managerial ownership is lower than 25% of shares held 
by executive directors and “0” otherwise.
The managerial ownership of the company is held by the executive 
directors who have the shareholding in the company. The agency theory 
suggests that the increase of shares owned by the executive directors will 
reduce the agency cost (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). It is suggested that, 
the managerial ownership can motivate the directors to enhance their 
performance and align the interest of the managers and shareholders. Previous 
studies in business portrayed mixed result where there is insignificant and 
nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance 
(Tee & Chan, 2008; Jelinek & Stuerke, 2009). These results suggest that a 
certain level of managerial ownership would reduce performance. At this 
level, the managerial ownership can lead to management entrenchment and 
ineffective monitoring due to a conflict of interest. The foregoing discussion 
thus leads to the following null hypothesis:
H4: There is no association between managerial ownership and family 
firm performance.
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FINDINGS
Board Size        
This study indicates that the average board size of Malaysian family-
owned companies is eight (8) directors. This is according to the mean score 
of 7.5 with the minimum and maximum number of directors of 4 and 15 
for all years respectively.  This mean result is consistent with Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006) and Ibrahim et. al. (2008).  This study carried out a narrow 
analysis which categorizes the board size into small and large. The small 
board consists of 1 to 9 directors, while the large boards are more than 
9 members.  Table 4.2 indicates that most family-owned companies in 
Malaysia have a small board rather than a large one, about 870 out of 983 
observed companies. Previous studies found that a small size is positively 
related to better performance of the companies (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, 
Singh & DavidsonI, 2003; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006).
Board Composition           
Descriptive statistics on board composition shows that the average 
proportion of independent directors on the board of director is 40.7% with 
the mean score 0.407. Therefore, the result indicates that family firms have 
fulfilled the MCCG 2000 requirement recommending that at least one 
third of the board should be independent directors. In the years 2006 and 
2007, the minimum and maximum proportion of independent directors is 
0.17 and 0.80 respectively. The year 2008 showed that the minimum and 
maximum proportion of independent directors is 0.22 and 0.80. However, 
in the year 2009, the proportion of independent directors decreased with 
similar result occurring in previous years. This study has categorized the 
board composition into two groups, less than 38% and more than 38% 
presence of independent directors on the board of directors. The specific 
percentage was chosen according to the findings of previous study (Chen 
and Nowland, 2008). Table 4 shows that the majority of the  companies 
have independent directors on the board of directors, less than 38% in the 
year 2006 and 2007, i.e about 149 and 140 companies. It shows that there 
is an increase number of family-owned companies having independent 
directors of more than 38 % on the board (133 for year 2008 and 103 for 
year 2009). The results indicate that family-owned companies were slow 
to adopt the MCCG requirement in their management.    
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Role Duality        
The results indicate that 51.4% (505 companies) of the family firms 
are practising role duality (see Table 4). Specifically, from the year 2006 
until 2008, the percentage of role duality decreases annually. For the year 
2009, the result showed an increase on the percentage of separation of 
role duality among family-owned companies (55.4% or 108 companies). 
Therefore, the results indicated that family firms in Malaysia start to practice 
the separation of role duality in their companies in compliance with the best 
practice of MCCG code. 
Table 4:  Descriptive Statistics For Nominal Independent
All 2006 2007 2008 2009
Firms % Firms % Firms % Firms % Firms %
Duality 505 51.4 142 53.4 138 52.5 138 46.7 87 44.6
Separation 478 48.6 124 46.6 125 47.5 121 53.3 108 55.4
Small Board 870 88.5 236 88.7 236 89.7 226 87.3 172 88.2
Large Board 113 11.15 30 11.3 27 10.3 33 12.7 23 11.8
< 38% of independent dir. 507 51.6 149 56 140 53.2 126 48.6 92 47.2
> 38% of independent dir. 476 48.4 117 44 123 46.8 133 51.4 103 52.8
< 25% of executive dir. 954 97 260 100 263 100 259 100 166 85.1
> 25% of executive dir. 29 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 14.9
Table 5 presents the descriptive analysis of ROA and ROE based 
on the categories of dummy variables which consists of board size, board 
composition and managerial ownership. Independent sample T-test was used 
to test whether the mean score for ROA and ROE between two groups of the 
categories of dummy variables are significantly different. The parametric 
test indicates that only board size and board composition has significant 
difference of ROA and ROE. The results showed that the mean score for 
ROA and ROE of BODSIZE for large board is significantly higher than 
the mean score for small board. This indicates that the large board has a 
better performance compared to small board. Besides, the mean score for 
ROA and ROE of BCOM for less than 38% of independent directors on 
the board is significantly higher than the mean score for more than 38% of 
independent directors on the board. This indicates that companies with less 
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than 38% of independent directors have better performance and when the 
board have more than 38% of independent directors, the firm performance 
begin to decline. Both results are significant at 1% level. 
Table 5:  Independence Sample T-Test for ROA and ROE 
 by Categories of Dummy Variables
Variables Categories of Dummy Variables N Mean t
ROA ROE ROA ROE
BODSIZE 1 – 9 director members 870 .037 .118 -3.990*** -5.600***
> 9 director members 113 .043 .154
BCOM < 38% of independent directors 507 .040 .130 4.317*** 3.719***
>38% of independent directors 476 .035 .114
MOWNSHIP < 25% of executive director’s 
shares
954 .037 .122 -.607 .589
< 25% of executive director’s 
shares
29 .039 .115
***Significant at the 1 per cent level (2-tailed)
Henceforth, the test result of hypotheses in the study is summarized 
in Table 6.
Table 6:  Regression Analysis Result
Hypothesis Null Hypotheses Variables Result Alternative Hypotheses
ROA ROE
1 BSIZE There is no association between 
the board size and family firm 
performance.





2 DUAL There is no association between 







3 BODCOM There is no association between 







4 MOWN There is no association between 
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The study rejects the null hypotheses that there is no association 
between the family-owned companies’ performance and corporate 
governance mechanisms. This study accepts the alternative hypotheses 
which provide significant association between family-owned companies’ 
performance and board size, role duality, board composition and managerial 
ownership. The results showed that board size has a significant negative 
relationship with firm performance on ROE. The results are similar to 
Ibrahim et. al. (2008) who found significant negative association between 
board size and family firms’ performance in Companies listed on Bursa 
Malaysia (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006).  The possible explanation is that a 
small board is easier to administer and manage (Singh & Davidson III, 
2003), thus allowing effective monitoring of the management (Lipton & 
Lorsch, 1992; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The study suggests that small 
board size enables a dynamic board to produce an organized and systematic 
management that can reduce the agency cost. Therefore, the firms will have 
excellent performance. 
The variable duality role (DUAL) is found to have a significantly 
(p = 0.00) positive relationship with firm performance on ROA. Previous 
study supported the result. According to Dahya, Lonie & Power (1996), the 
combination of the role of CEO and chairman is the best way to manage a 
company. The findings of this study contradict with the findings of Ibrahim 
et. al. (2008) and Amran and Ahmad (2009). They found a significant 
negative association for Malaysian family-owned companies. This implies 
that the argument based on the stewardship theory where a director who 
holds the two top positions can easily achieve the company’s objectives. It 
is because the directors have superior knowledge and strong capability to 
manage the company and they act in the best interests of the firm. In addition, 
Bartholomeusz & Tanewski (2006) indicate family firms are considerably 
more likely than non-family firms to allow the role of CEO and the chairman 
to be held by the same person. Breton-Miller and Miller (2009) found that 
having a family CEO as a steward can influence the business. He has the 
ability to facilitate rapid decision making which is useful in a dynamic setting 
maintaining the integrity which could strengthen the firms’ performance. 
The result for board composition (BODCOM) has a significant 
negative association with the firm’s performance on ROE. This result is 
consistent with Ibrahim et. al. (2008). They found significant negative 
association between independent directors and firm performance and 
suggest that the presence of independent directors on the board does not 
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improve the Malaysian family-owned companies’ performance. This result 
is also similar to Mishra (2001) and Klein et. al. (2005) who found negative 
relationship between independent directors and firm performance. One 
possible explanation is that family members actively monitor their manager 
and understand their company better (Kang, 1998). The study suggests that 
the monitoring mechanism of family-owned companies relating to family 
members’ trust, integrity and stewardship with accountability to deliver 
their commitment creates competitive advantages for the success of the 
companies. In addition, the presence of the majority independent directors in 
family firm tend to have a poor performance due to inadequate knowledge of 
the firm and focus on short term goal by the managers (Klein et. al., 2005). 
On the other hand, the results found that the managerial ownership have 
a relationship with family-owned companies on ROA and ROE. However, 
both results have contrary significant association between them. The firm 
performance based on ROA has negative relationship with managerial 
ownership. The result indicates the increasing level of insider shareholding 
cannot solve the agency problem in enhancing firm performance. This results 
are supported by Jelinek and Stuerke (2009) who found that a negative 
relationship between managerial equity ownership and firm performance at 
certain level of managerial ownership. One possible explanation is a higher 
level of managerial ownership can lead to management entrenchment and 
ineffective monitoring due to a conflict of interest (Cheu & Leung, 2006).
Other possible explanation is when the executive directors hold a 
higher level of shares in the company, they have sufficient control of the 
decisions which could expropriated the minority shareholders (Fan & 
Wong, 2002). Anderson and Reeb (2003) found a negative relationship 
between managerial ownership and firm performance at a certain level 
of managerial ownership for Standard and Poors 500 U.S. companies. 
However, Table 6 shows that family-owned companies’ performances on 
ROE have significant positive association with managerial ownership. The 
result is similar to Jensen and Meckling (1976). The study found that the 
higher level of managerial ownership aligns the interest of managers and 
shareholders, thus lowering agency cost and increasing firm’s value. The 
study suggests that the insider shareholding is a motivating mechanism for 
directors to provide excellent performance to the firms. Therefore, they 
could enhance the firm performance. 
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SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS            
The study reveals a strong relationship between firms with small boards 
and firm’s performance. Hence this study suggests that small board could 
be good for corporate governance mechanisms to improve the companies’ 
performance. Small board is easier to manage and is also effective in 
monitoring the management. In addition, most of the Malaysian family-
owned companies studied (870 out of 983 companies) have small board 
directors.  The firm value of family-owned companies has a higher profit 
when role duality exists. The results showed that the corporate governance 
of family-owned companies is different with non-family firms.  The 
study suggests that role duality could be a superior corporate governance 
mechanism which tends to increase firms performance. The directors with 
dual leadership help to strengthen the role of the CEO as the chairman which 
effectively monitors the management. The dual leadership can be practiced 
in management if a candidate with sound knowledge and accountability is 
able to manage the business without causing power imbalance. According 
to the Code of Corporate Governance, firm can practice role duality on 
the board which has strong independent element and is able to balance the 
power and authority and publicly explained to the stakeholders. 
CONCLUSION
According to the Code of Corporate Governance, an effective board 
composition with independent judgment in decision making should have 
at least one third of the board membership. Therefore, the presence of 
independent directors on the board as a monitoring mechanism is to 
enhance the firm’s performance. However, the representation of independent 
directors on the board of directors in family firm does not improve the 
firm’s performance. The study found that the relationship between the firm’s 
performance and board composition for Malaysian family-owned companies 
is significant negative on ROE. The study suggests that the monitoring 
mechanism of family-owned companies relating to family members’ trust, 
integrity and stewardship with accountability to deliver their commitment 
creates competitive advantages for the success of the companies.
The study shows significant evidence that managerial ownership 
serves as a motivation to the directors to perform better in management 
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which tends to improve the firm performance. In addition, there are different 
results on relationship between managerial ownership (MOWN) and firm 
value. The ROA value shows significant negative relationship with MOWN, 
suggesting that the increasing of insider shareholdings on the companies 
could weaken the firm value. The higher shares holding of the company 
held by executive directors reveal that entrenchment can occur and will 
reduce the firms’ performance. Hence, ROE value shows significant positive 
relationship with MOWN suggesting that increase of insider shareholdings 
on the companies could enhance the firms’ value. The insider shareholding 
is a motivating mechanism for directors to provide excellent performance 
to improve the firms. 
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